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Synopsis 
This contribution examines the increased European Union (EU) regulation within the healthcare sector, 
exemplified by the regulation of patient rights in cross border healthcare.  This provides an example of the 
various complexities arising from the operationalization of a European Union policy within nation states’ 
health systems. The contribution first analyses the judicial and political process through which patient 
rights in cross border health care became part of the EU regulatory competences, resulting in the adoption 
of the patient rights directive. The principles and content of this directive are found to be the most 
important regulatory piece of healthcare regulation within the EU to date. The contribution then examines 
the different set of challenges that EU healthcare governance introduces to the different healthcare 
systems of the Community. Thirdly, it analyses these challenges in two selected member states; the 
universalist and national healthcare system of Denmark and the insurance based healthcare system of 
Bulgaria. The two cases are selected because they vary in respect of on healthcare models  as well as health 
care packages, spending, degree of centralization and administrative capacity among other factors.  
 
Introduction 
Healthcare as a public policy has traditionally been governed exclusively by the nation state. As a policy 
area it belongs to the core of the welfare state. How to organize healthcare, which healthcare coverage to 
provide, how to prioritize and so forth are key themes in national elections and an essential link in the 
social contract between the state and its citizens. Healthcare has developed in relative isolation as a result 
of domestic politics and actors (Greer 2009: 1). The national isolation of healthcare has, however, been 
increasingly disturbed by the integration dynamics of the European Union. The meeting between national 
health policy and EU law marks tensions and contradictions: 
‘Health care policy in the European Union has, at its centre, a fundamental contradiction. On the one hand, 
recent Treaties, which are the definitive statements on the scope of European law, state explicitly that health 
care is a responsibility for Member States. On the other hand, as health systems involve interaction with people 
(staff and patients), goods (pharmaceuticals and devices) and services (health care funders and providers), all of 
whose freedom to move across borders is guaranteed by the same Treaty, it is increasingly apparent that many of 
their activities are subject to European law’ (Mossialos et al. 2001, p. 11).            
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For long, the right to cross border healthcare was governed by Community regulation 1408/71. 1 This 
regulation granted Community workers and later European citizens the right to acute healthcare treatment 
in another member as well as more limited access to planned healthcare treatment where the costs of care 
would be paid by the home member state (Martinsen 2009: 794-795; Palm and Glinos 2010: 514-515). The 
access to planned treatment in another member state was, however, firmly controlled nationally through 
the governing principle of ‘prior authorisation’. According to this principle, a patient would have to be 
authorized beforehand by the competent national institution to have planned treatment in another 
member state. This implied that in reality few patients planned cross border treatment as authorization 
was seldom issued (Martinsen 2007:14).  
Since the European Court of Justice in 1998 laid down that health care is not an ‘‘îlot impermeable a 
l’influence du droit communautaire’2 , judicial interpretation of internal market principles and the 
subsequent political process have challenged the national ability to control cross border care quite 
fundamentally.  
This EU development and its potential impact on national healthcare systems will be examined below. For 
this purpose, the contribution first presents the judicial process where the European Court of Justice 
applied internal market principles to the healthcare sector, then sets out the political negotiations leading 
to the Patient Rights Directive. The subsequent sections examine the content and overall implications of 
this Directive, how EU governance challenges the national healthcare systems in two selected member 
states; Denmark and Bulgaria, and how these two member states have initiated transposition of the 
Directive.  
With the European Court towards EU healthcare regulation  
In 1998, the European Court of Justice came out with two controversial rulings, laying down that health 
care is a service within the meaning of the Treaty, thus in principle to circulate freely.3 Health ministers 
were upset, arguing that the rulings had to be overturned by a Treaty amendment.4 Such Treaty 
amendment was, however, never adopted. In the end, Member States did not prioritize the matter 
sufficiently when negotiating the Treaty of Nice, and a Treaty clarification exempting health care from the 
internal market was not inserted (Martinsen and Falkner 2011).      
This initial outburst was then later met by significant silence and a long period of no EU initiative. The 
Member States evidently waited for the Commission to come up with a proposal, which took a long time to 
prepare. In the meantime, the European Court of Justice went further in its interpretations on patients’ 
rights and cross border health care. Its reasoning in a number of cases implies that for the wide scope of 
non-hospital care, a patient can go to another member state without authorisation from his/her home 
state, pay for the cost of treatment up front and subsequently have the costs reimbursed back home – up 
to what a similar treatment would have cost in the home member state.  
Initially only the impact on social insurance systems was interpreted. National health service systems 
continued  to argue that the rationale and reasoning of the Court cases did not apply to their systems as 
they are genuinely different, with limited elements of private pay and healthcare provided as benefit in 
kind. However, in the 2006 Watts case5 , the Court for the first time considered the implications for 
national health services. The Court concluded that the internal market principle applies to all healthcare 
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systems, irrespective of how they are financed or how they provide healthcare. The Court also stated that 
patients have a right to cross border treatment if the waiting-time for a similar treatment in their own 
member state exceeded what  is acceptable.  
In the 2007 case of Stamatelakis6, the Court ruled that a member state cannot exclude reimbursing 
treatment in another member state on the grounds that it is provided in a private hospital. In the case, the 
Greek government submitted that the balance of the system is at risk if citizens can travel to private 
hospitals in EU countries without Greece having established agreements with those hospitals. However, 
these concerns were ruled out by the Court, which instead clarified that the Greek ban on reimbursement 
for private healthcare abroad is against Community law.   
With this line of case law it took the European Court of Justice less than 10 years to apply internal market 
principles to national healthcare systems, disregarding how they are organized, financed or provide 
healthcare. Judicial decision-making had thus made a rapid intervention in a public policy domain once 
governed exclusively by national politics and protected by national borders.   
 
Political negotiations on patient rights in cross border healthcare  
The first attempt to respond to the Court’s rulings came when the Commission, rather unsuccessfully, 
attempted to integrate the health care area in the Bolkestein Directive on services in the internal market, 
inserted in the Commission’s proposal as an article 23.7 The health ministers, however, were alarmed to 
have their policy area regulated as part of a general Directive on services, placed under the responsibility of 
DG Internal Market.  Article 23, and thus the health care area, was taken out of the Directive.    
Consequently it appeared clear that European health care could not be regulated from an overall internal 
market perspective, but the case law of the Court still called for a political response. The case law had 
disturbed the traditional national demarcation of healthcare policies, there was a need to reestablish legal 
certainty. After considerable preparatory steps, expert considerations and a failed attempt to present a 
proposal back in December 2007, the Commission finally proposed its directive on the 2 July 2008 on 
patient rights in cross border healthcare.8   
The subsequent negotiation process became tense, ripe with conflicts on different dimensions of the 
proposal. The Council of Ministers had great difficulties in establishing a common position between the 
member states. Only 2-3 member states were in favour when the proposal was first presented by the 
Commission (A. Vassillou, 2980th meeting, Press Conference, 1st December 2009). A significant number of 
Ministers expressed concerns about national sovereignty, and wished to tighten national control in cross 
border care by means of prior authorization. Especially southern European nations expressed concerns, and 
in December 2009 Spain led a blocking minority against the Swedish Presidency compromise text, and the 
Council thus failed to reach an agreement. However, during 2010 disagreements were eased. In the second 
reading, a qualified majority was established in the Council but Austria, Poland, Portugal and Romania 
voted no and Slovakia abstained. The European Parliament also had difficulties in establishing  a majority 
position. The Christian Democrats (EPP) and the Liberals (ALDE) were generally in favour of the 
Commission’s proposal, but the Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D) was divided internally on various 
issues, especially on the fundamental question of the correct legal base for the Directive and the issue of 
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prior authorization. However, gradually a compromise was established and by March 2011 the Directive 
was adopted by both institutions. The adopted text differs from the original proposal by the Commission on 
several aspects. A dual legal basis has been reached. The internal market legal base Article 114 TFEU 
constitutes the main legal basis,  but Article 168 TFEU (on public health) has also been inserted. Another 
significant compromise is that prior authorization is accepted as the means of national control, but only 
allowed for care subject to planning; that is hospitalization or healthcare being highly specialized or 
implying cost-intensive medical infrastructure or equipment.  
The process which finally reached a compromise on patient rights in cross border care substantiates that it 
took the representatives of the welfare states in the Council and a considerable part of European 
Parliamentarians quite some time to accept that health care falls under the rules of the internal market. 
The politicians managed to negotiate some exemptions to the general rule of free movement, but the 
process also substantiates that despite such political reservations, it is now a European binding norm that 
health care constitutes a service within the meaning of the Treaty, with all its implications. The principles 
and content of the Directive are substantial, with impact for all member states albeit depending on the 
national health system in place.  
 
Content and overall implications of the patient rights directive 
Among the 22 articles of the directive, at least seven appear to challengethe established status quo of 
national healthcare provisions across the EU, albeit to different degrees and to varying extent across the 
member states.  
Article 4 establishes that where member states may be providing  treatment they are obliged to ensure 
that national contact points provide patients with the relevant information on the standards of national 
healthcare (article 4.2.a). Member states are also responsible for ensuring  that healthcare providers 
provide the relevant information for patients to make an informed choice on treatment options, 
availability, quality and safety and that the providers have clear invoices and clear information on prices, 
among other aspects (article 4.2.b).  
Article 5 obliges the home member state (i.e. the member state where the patient is insured)  to ensure 
that there are mechanisms in place to inform patients about their rights and entitlements in relation to 
cross border healthcare, conditions for reimbursement of costs as well as information on appeal and 
redress. Article 6 lays down that member states shall establish one or more national contact points. 
National contact points shall facilitate the exchange of relevant information regarding health services 
(article 6.2).  
Article 7 establishes the principles of reimbursement of the costs of cross border care.  Member states are 
obliged to ‘to have a transparent mechanism for calculation of costs of cross-border healthcare that are to 
be reimbursed to the insured person by the Member State of affiliation. This mechanism shall be based on 
objective, non-discriminatory criteria known in advance’ (article 7.6).  
Article 8 deals with the issue of prior authorization, one of the most controversial issues in the case law and 
during the negotiations on the directive. De facto it lays down a distinction between three types of 
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healthcare services; hospital care, highly specialized and cost-intensive care, and non-hospital care. For 
hospital care as well as highly specialized and cost-intensive care prior authorization may be justified 
whereas it is not for non-hospital care. Prior authorization may not be refused if the requested healthcare 
cannot be provided in the member state of affiliation ‘within a time limit which is medically justifiable, 
based on an objective medical assessment of the patient’s medical condition, the history and probable 
course of the patient’s illness, the degree of the patient’s pain and/or the nature of the patient’s disability 
at the time when the request for authorization was made or renewed’ (article 8.5). The member state of 
affiliation shall make publicly available which healthcare is subject to prior authorization (article 8.7).  
Article 9 obliges the member states of affiliation to ensure accessible administrative procedures, based on 
objective, non-discriminatory criteria which are necessary and proportionate to the objective (article 9.1.). 
Member states shall also ensure that individual decisions are properly reasoned and capable of being 
judicially challenged (article 9.4). Finally, article 11 lays down mutual recognition of prescriptions, issued in 
another member state.  
These 7 articles are likely to have considerable consequences for national healthcare governance, 
depending on national healthcare schemes and how member state authorities understand and comply with 
their responsibilities. They oblige member states to develop and make accessible information on key 
component of healthcare provisions; standards, quality, pricing, administrative procedures, exit rights. 
Accessible and transparent information becomes a public responsibility and member states will have to 
intervene in relation to healthcare providers, be they public or private, to make such available. This call for 
certain degree of centralization, where the national governance level supervise that the obligations are 
complied with.  
The implications of these seven articles are manifold. Below we will examine how the principles and 
content of the directive challenge two different healthcare systems represented by the Danish and 
Bulgarian member states, first from an overall institutional perspective, then by presenting in brief the first 
phase of transposition in these two rather different member states.  
 
National healthcare systems and European governance 
Albeit there are no two identical healthcare systems, the European health polities can roughly be divided in 
two distinct families. On the one side the universalistic, tax financed Beveridge model, also known as 
National Health System (NHS); and on the other the corporatist, social insurance contributions based 
Bismarckian system, or Health Insurance System (HIS) (Neergaard, 2011, p. 20). These two families differ on 
key characteristics which are of crucial importance for the successful implementation of the Directive. Of 
specific importance to the implementation of the directive are: 1) the level of centralization of the health 
system, i.e. which institution or governance level are responsible for the supply of healthcare, 2) the 
financing principles and the importance of out-of-pocket payments (OPPs), 3) the presence of defined 
benefits package and clear pricing of medical services as well as 4) governance principles in relation to the 
effectiveness and quality of the healthcare sector. The two cases selected for this study differ on all of 
these criteria and this is the reason they have been selected.  
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One of the most striking distinctions between the Danish and the Bulgarian cases is the level of 
centralization found in the two systems. Whilst the Bulgarian system is under the unconditional monopoly 
of the National Health Insurance Fund (NHIF), a semi-public, non-profit organization charged with the 
payment of services procured by Bulgarian insurance carriers from healthcare providers (Dimova et al., 
2012, p. 55), the Danish system is considerably more decentralized. Healthcare in Denmark is a shared 
responsibility between the state, the five regions and the 98 municipalities. Within this power equation the 
state is mainly responsible for legislation, the regions for organizing and delivering services, whereas the 
municipalities have the responsibility for a number of prevention and rehabilitation services (Martinsen & 
Vrangbaek, 2007, p. 173). The decentralization of the Danish system means that there is a political 
environment in which the implementation of the Directive is in the hands of significantly more actors, than 
in the Bulgarian system. This is likely to lead to complications and impediments.  
Secondly, the Danish and the Bulgarian systems differ in the ways in which healthcare services are financed 
and supplied. The Danish healthcare scheme is tax financed, providing  universal public health service for all 
residents. The Bulgarian compulsory social insurance scheme is financed by contributions from Bulgarian 
citizens and from residents in Bulgaria and a scheme funded by taxes providing benefits in kind, other than 
those provided by the contribution-funded scheme.   
In addition, the amount of ‘Out of Pocket Payment’ (OPP) differs greatly between Denmark and 
Bulgaria.Here it must be underlined that these come under various forms, from complementary payment 
for services which are not fully covered, through user fees and ultimately to ‘under the table payments’. 
Our data does not give us a direct inside into the individual forms of OPP but they are clearly a lot lower in 
Denmark than in Bulgaria.  In Denmark their figure stands at 14% of the total current health expenditure for 
2008 (latest available data) whereas in Bulgaria it is as high as 42% (source Eurostat, 2013). The data from 
Eurostat is based on national statistical and administrative sources reflecting the national characteristics of 
the health system, which means that they may not be completely comparable. Nevertheless, what is 
certain, is that the Danish NHS system operates at much lower levels of OPP in the financing of healthcare, 
whereas OPPs are a highly important financing source in Bulgaria. Ultimately the OPPs ‘reflect a scarcity of 
resources in the health care system’ (Balabanova & McKee, 2002, p. 269). Especially informal payments 
have severe consequences on the effectiveness of the system, because the flow of resources into the 
system in part depends on  the willingness and need of patients to make informal payments (Dubois & 
McKee 2004: 49-50). Budgetary transparency, capacity planning and equity are difficult to uphold in a 
system that in part relies on informal payments. OPPs, including informal payments, could potentially play a 
crucial role in the utilization of the Directive by the Bulgarian patients pushing them further towards taking 
advantage of the Directive in order to circumvent informal payments. In addition, the issue of wide-spread 
OPPs in Bulgaria could prove prohibitive to foreign patients who are unaware of more informal practices. 
The informal procedures of the Bulgarian system are likely to be challenged by the Directive’s article 9, 
laying down that the Member State of affiliation shall have accessible and transparent administrative 
procedures, which are accessible to judicial redress. This highlights the importance of functioning 
complaints procedures as these will be particularly important for safeguarding patients’ rights and by 
extension for the successful implementation of the directive.  
A third distinction between the two systems stemming from their basic characteristics as NHS or HIS is the 
existence of specified benefits packages. HISs must provide a clear list of services which will be covered so 
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health providers within the system operate with a pre-defined benefits packages, whereas their NHS 
counterparts are more free to choose the services they can offer. In Denmark, the lack of clear benefits 
packages is also a result of the decentralization of the system and the lack of clear division of 
responsibilities. The 2007 Health Act which delegated the responsibility for the medical care of each patient 
to the regions, and the preventive services aimed at the general population and for rehabilitation and 
home care for patients to the municipalities, puts no one actor in charge of preparing the benefits package 
(Olejaz et al., 2012, p. 62). When it comes to the presence of clearly defined prices the two countries 
operate with different systems. Determined prices are a direct consequence of the precise benefit package 
in Bulgaria. In the Danish system, prices are calculated in the basis of DRG (Diagnosis Related Groups) 
prices, set between the regions and the national healthcare providers.  
Finally, the governance principles in relation to the effectiveness and quality of the healthcare sector differ. 
In Denmark, the ‘family doctor’, i.e. the General Practitioner (GP) serves as an important gatekeeper for 
healthcare treatment and has been regarded as important for the quality of care, bridging patients 
demands and system supply. The GP thus has a most important control function in the Danish system, 
including access to pharmaceuticals by means of prescriptions, referring patients to specialist treatment 
and hospital care, ensuring continuity of care, providing information on care among other factors. In 
carrying out these tasks, the GP has an equally important function for the system, controlling healthcare 
expenditures. The GP refers all patients insured in group 1  to specialized care and all patients to hospital 
care. The group 1 insured will not be able to access specialized care, hospital care or prescribed medicine 
without the consent of the GP. A patient, once referred by the GP, has an extended free choice of hospital 
care if s/he cannot be treated within one month in his/her own region. In that case the patient can chose 
healthcare at a public hospital in another region or at a private or foreign healthcare provider with which 
the Danish regions have established an agreement beforehand. Thus currently waiting time for hospital 
care is set to be low by means of this extended free choice. The Danish NHS system thus currently operates 
relatively effectively, and the GP is regarded as an important gatekeeper for the quality of care. In Bulgaria 
the role of the General Practitioner is comparable to their Danish counterpart. The GP serves as an access 
point for incoming patients, assessing their overall health condition and evaluating the needs of patients for 
further medical treatment. In this sense the function of ‘gatekeeper’ is also to be found in the Bulgarian GP 
system, with one important addition. In order to receive specialized care (i.e. laboratory tests, inpatient 
care, specialist examination, etc.) patients need to receive a medical referral from their GP. The medical 
referral keeps the cost of specialized care under control, effectively eliminates long waiting times for 
patients, but it also aggressively restricts access to potentially life-saving treatments. This is due to the fact 
that the number of referrals is limited to the GPs, causing patients to wait because GP referrals are 
rationed.  Referrals are rationed every month, meaning that a Bulgarian patient might have to wait more 
than a month to receive a referral from their GP. Without a referral the patient has to pay extra to receive 
the treatment, unless they also have voluntary health insurance9 (which only covers a marginal portion of 
the population). The only specialized medical treatment for which no referral is required is dental care. In a 
situation where medical referrals become unavailable to the patients for a prolonged period of time this 
could lead to a situation where the Bulgarian state as the member state of affiliation under the provisions 
of the directive must provide prior authorization because it cannot provide medical treatment within a 
medically justified time period, i.e. without ‘undue delay’. In this situation the directive would effectively 
extend the coverage of Bulgarian patients, simultaneously crippling the control the GPs provide.  
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The complex situation of Bulgarian GPs means that they will be practically inaccessible to foreign patients. 
GPs are very unlikely to give out referrals to foreigners as they need to keep their ‘personal’ patients 
supplied. This would almost completely eliminate the option of seeking specialized inpatient treatment in 
Bulgaria unless foreign patients are prepared to pay the full price of the treatment, in which case they still 
have to consider the potential reduced standards of quality under which it will be delivered. 
Ultimately the cases of Denmark and Bulgaria represent maximum variations of the possible developments 
of healthcare systems within Europe. In the subsequent paragraphs we will examine how these variations 
are likely to influence the implementation of the Patients’ rights Directive.  
 
Transposing the patient rights directive 
The patient rights directive is to be transposed by the member states by 25th October 2013. At the time of 
writing this contribution in early 2013, member states are still in full process of transposition for which 
reason it is only possible to draw out some overall challenges. 
In Denmark, the Ministry of Health is responsible for the transposition of the Directive. The regions will 
however be responsible for the practical implementation of the Directive, when Danish patients request 
cross border care or foreign patients Danish care. The regions express their increasing frustration of not 
being closely involved in the transposition process which is said to be carried out in rather secluded manner 
by few civil servants in the Ministry of Health (Interviews November 2012). Especially the role of the 
contact points is found to be crucial but unclear. Contact points with high level of services are likely to lead 
to an enhanced  inflow of foreign patients, whereas poor information is likely to limit de facto patient 
inflow and simultaneously increasing uncertainty. Key questions are still unanswered. How many contact 
points will have to be set up? Will they have to provide information in foreign languages? What willl be the 
extent and standard of information?  
In Bulgaria for the overall monitoring of the actual implementation the competent institution is the 
Ministry of Labor and Social Policy. It follows the legislation prepared by the Ministry of Health in close 
partnership with the NHIF. The NHIF prepares concrete suggestions for the reform of functioning national 
legislation and after these suggestions are accepted by the Ministry of Health the process of transposition 
can begin in the National Assembly. On the issue of national contact points the Ministry of Health and the 
NHIF are passing responsibility between each other as to who would have to take over the establishment of 
these bodies. Since staffing the contact points requires people with language skills, knowledge of the 
normative statute and the intricacies of the national and international health systems, neither the Ministry 
nor the NHIF is willing to spare any of their staff to take on this new task (Interviews November, 2012). 
Concerning contact points,  we already see how the resource unavailability of the Bulgarian system will 
start influencing the implementation in its early stages and is likely to lead to understaffing of the contact 
points and result in their inability to handle the workload. 
Concerning the financing principles of the healthcare system, the limited OPP and no ‘under the table 
payment’ in Denmark limit the private economic motivation for patients to seek cross border healthcare.   
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As a NHS system, Danish public healthcare has not traditionally operated with clear patient rights and 
defined healthcare packages. The patient rights directive operates with a fundamentally different logic 
establishing a focus on patient rights, judicial redress and clear information on quality, standards and 
pricing. In this way, the governing principle of the EU directive is to enable the patient to carry out an 
informed choice and eventually exit from the national supply if not satisfied. The national authorities 
become responsible for proving the information and processes to facilitate both exits and inflow. In 
addition, ‘clear pricing’ is not straightforward for the Danish model. So far the Ministry of Health point to 
DRG prices as the natural level of price setting, turning to existing solutions (Interviews, August and 
November 2012). But representatives from the regions have pointed out that the DRG is a rather abstract 
means of price setting, not disaggregating the different components of a healthcare service, nor specifying 
when a healthcare treatment begins and ends (Ibid.). DRG prices might function in a national setting, where 
between regions and national healthcare providers have learned to trust this price mechanism, but in an 
internal market they hardly constitute transparent nor full prices (ibid.).  
Prices of the medical services in Bulgaria are listed in the national framework contract, a record of all 
medical services offered in the Bulgarian system and covered by the NHIF. The framework contract 
however suffers from a central flaw – medical treatment prices in Bulgaria are drastically and inherently  
undervalued (Interviews November, 2012).  This has to do with the fact that the entire system is 
underfinanced because of extremely low social insurance contributions. Although they represent 8 percent 
of the official income of employed people, the overall low level of payment in Bulgaria, the undocumented 
labour and other factors contributing to the ‘shadow economy’ leave the healthcare system necessitous 
and cash-strapped. A direct consequence is the aforementioned ubiquitous OPPs, where patients need to 
‘co-finance’ their treatments. However the low prices of medical services in Bulgaria are unlikely to lead to 
increased medical tourism after the implementation of the directive. All accounts point out that medical 
tourism in Bulgaria is underdeveloped and a major impediment for it is the low quality of services 
(Interviews November, 2012). In addition the low pricing of services is sure to have a prohibitive influence 
on the cross border mobility of  Bulgarian patients since the services they might acquire abroad will only be 
reimbursed to a very low level, due to the undervalued Bulgarian pricing.   
Finally, the governance principles concerning effectiveness and ensuring quality of care are seriously 
disturbed by EU governance. At the moment, waiting times are generally relatively low in Denmark. Thus 
the Directive’s principle that patients have a right to hospital, specialized and cost intensive care if care 
cannot be provided without undue delay is no immediate challenge to DK concerning Danish patients 
seeking cross border care. However, it may spur a considerable inflow of foreign patients. Some healthcare 
providers in DK may be highly attractive to patients in other member states due to effectiveness and quality 
of care. This will imply both challenges and new opportunities to a healthcare model, traditionally planning 
capacity strictly according to national demands. Furthermore, the Danish model of ensuring quality of care 
with the assigned ‘family doctor’, the GP, as gatekeeper is challenged. With the directive, a patient may ask 
a GP in a another member state for his/her opinion and advice and thus bypass the governance function 
that the GP has traditionally occupied. Also pharmaceuticals in other member states will be accessible by 
means of mutual recognition of prescriptions. The issue of pharmaceutical prescriptions is also expected to 
be problematic in Bulgaria as the country is the only one in the EU to use Cyrillic, effectively making its 
prescriptions a difficult read in the rest of the Union.  The GP control function in the Danish model is thus in 
question and enhance de facto cross border care. Also doctors as a profession will be met by increased 
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demands of Europeanization to which they will have to adapt. This includes linguistic challenges, the 
demand and expectation of foreign medical practices and high mobility patients who can question doctors’ 
assessment abroad. 
 
Conclusions  
The structural differences between the two systems presented here result in different conditions in which 
the directive must be implemented. These conditions effectively build two different environments in which 
the identical text of the directive is sure to have differing implications.  
In the Danish case the lack of clear pricing and benefits packages will make the practical implication of the 
directive particularly difficult for the Danish authorities. The directive is also likely to challenge the control 
that the GP ensures over the system as patients will have access to European general practitioners. These 
issues will introduce challenges to the planning and execution of the Danish system, depending on the size 
of mobility. If patient mobility maintains its character of a marginal phenomenon, largely limited to the 
border regions (Baeten, 2012, p. 26) its effects in Denmark are likely to be negligible. At first sight, high 
quality of care and relative efficient treatment, i.e. low waiting lists, are likely to cause an inflow of foreign 
patients to the Danish system. However, if waiting times extend and limited quality are highlighted by 
European comparisons, the Danish system could face more Danish patients opting for treatment abroad.  
Both patient inflow and outflow could lead to pressure on the delivery of care, as capacity planning would 
become more difficult. Danish taxpayers would have to carry the additional administrative costs of foreign 
patients’ entry into the Danish system as well as reimbursing procedures executed on Danish patients 
abroad.  
In Bulgaria the overall low level of income is likely to cripple any of the benefits that the directive could 
provide. Since the directive covers expenses only to the point of coverage in the state of affiliation medical 
treatment abroad under the directive’s provisions will be near to impossible for the majority of the 
Bulgarian population. Since medical services in Bulgaria are generally undervalued, this makes their pricing 
drastically lower in Bulgaria, and it means that the difference between the price covered by the NHIF and 
the price charged abroad would have to be paid by the patient. The directive is furthermore dwarfed in its 
influence by the functioning of Regulation 883/2004 which stipulates complete coverage of any medical 
treatment as long as it is offered by the state of affiliation and prior authorization has been issued. Thus for 
the Bulgarian patient, the Regulation is certainly the more attractive alternative.  
The differing degree of centralization in both health polities is likely to be an advantage in the Bulgarian 
case as it operates with a reduced number of veto players and concentrates the transposition and 
implementation tasks within very few central institutions. We have seen the issue of national contact 
points cause friction between two of these institutions, but the close communication between them is 
likely to facilitate a compromise on this issue. In the Danish case, the attempt to concentrate the 
implementation procedures within the Ministry of Health has caused some frustration to the regions, who 
will be responsible for the practical implementation of the Directive.  
The distinction drawn here between Denmark and Bulgaria, highlighting the main organizational features of 
the systems, accentuates the difficulties the national executive and policy makers face in the course of 
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implementation of the directive on cross-border patients’ rights. Although all of the member states are 
implementing the same legislative text, the domestic resources and institutional particularities of 
healthcare systems will lead to distinctive impediments and specific member state challenges. This means 
that further implementation analysis will need to pay closer attention to the existing national institutional 
environment, the actors within and around these and the challenges that it is predisposed to cause in the 
course of implementation.   
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